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I. INTRODUCTION
A . BACKGROUND
Procurement authority for the Federal Government is
derived from the Constitution as a power exercised under the
general powers of the Sovereign. The secretary or adminis-
trator of most federal departments and agencies is
authorized to make purchases and contract for goods and
services. Contracting authority is delegated to the
directors of the offices that carry out the contracting
activities [Ref. l:pp. 34-35] who, in turn, usually further
grant to contracting officers [Ref. 2:p. 24]. Congress
directs, through its legislative process, the laws from
which the Executive branch will formulate acquisition policy
and implementing procedures.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides the
following definition:
"Contracting officer" means a person with the authority
to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts and
make related determinations and findings. The term includes
certain authorized representatives of the contracting
officer acting within the limits of their authority as
delegated by the contracting officer.
[Ref. 3:p. 2-1]
Since April 1, 1984, the principal regulation providing
guidance to the contracting agencies is the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation (FAR) . The FAR is further modified by FAR
supplements issued by the Department of Defense (DOD)
,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) , and
others. Additional rules affecting the acquisition process
originate from a number of different sources, for example,
Executive Orders of the President, the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) , and service secretaries. [Ref
.
2:pp. 10-15]
To satisfy Government's material and service
requirements, contracting officers award contracts, defined
as "a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the
seller to furnish supplies or services (including construc-
tion) and the buyer to pay for them." [Ref. 3:p. 2-1] The
majority of contracting actions run quite efficiently and
flow from the initial requirements determination to comple-
tion with no difficulties. On other occasions the contract
could result in a termination with no cost to the Government
or the contractor (a no cost settlement) , a termination for
the convenience (T for C) of the Government, or a
termination for contractor default (T for D)
.
From the Government's standpoint, T for C is an expen-
sive method of discontinuing a contractual relationship with
a supplier. Nonetheless, there are occasions when it is in
the best interests of the Government to execute a T for C.
"If the contracting officer decides to terminate for
convenience, the Government's liability will be admitted and
the contractor will recover his incurred cost and profit on
work done." [Ref. 2:p. 776] T for C's are used most often
when the Government no longer requires the contracted goods
or services.
1. Termination for Default
A T for D is the Government's ultimate method of
dealing with a contractor's failure to comply with the terms
of the contract. When the Government exercises its right to
terminate for default, the contractor becomes liable for the
consequences of the contract breach. The FAR specifies the
justifications for terminating the contractor by use of the
default clause. For example, the default clause for "fixed
price supply and services" contracts provides for termina-
tion, completely or partially, if the contractor fails to:
(a) make delivery of the supplies or to perform the
services within the time specified in this contract,
(b) perform any other provision of this contract, or
(c) make progress and that failure endangers perform-
ance of the contract. [Ref. 3:p. 49-15]
Additionally, the contractor could be terminated for
default in two other situations:
The first—failure to proceed—arises where the
contractor fails or refuses to go forward with the work
according to directions of the contracting officer. The
second—anticipatory repudiation—occurs when the contrac-
tor clearly expressed through words or conduct an inten-
tion not to complete the contract work on time. [Ref.
B:p. 640]
However, the contracting officer's termination
decision is not the final word. The terminated contractor
is not without recourse. Appendix B graphically portrays
the routes of contractor relief. The Armed Services Board
of Appeals (ASBCA) is the administrative avenue while the
U.S. Claims Court is the judicial course of appeal. The
ASBCA is the DOD and service secretaries' authorized
administrative representative in resolving contract
disputes. The ASBCA renders decisions concerning guestions
of fact through the administrative procedure specified in
the Disputes clause of the contract. A standard contract
Disputes clause is provided as Appendix C.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
There is no on-going systematic effort to incorporate
the new precedents established by the ASBCA decisions and
the implementation of new legislation into a usable form
that contracting officers can use on a daily basis. This
knowledge is vital if the contracting officer is to execute
his/her duties "in the best interests of the Government."
The most complete information concerning ASBCA decisions can
be obtained from Board of Contract Appeals Decisions . The
Federal Contract Report and other publications periodically
highlight specific decisions, but the completeness of the
analysis, in the total scheme of things, is usually inade-
guate to be of much use at the working level of the
contracting process.
The Board of Contract Appeals Decisions published by the
Commerce Clearing House Inc., is presented in a case-mix
format and consists of thousands of pages per year. The
tailored extracts available from Federal Legal Information
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through Electronics (FLITE) , while being less cumbersome, are
not readily available nor in a usable form to substantially
benefit contracting officers in their day-to-day operations.
This research will address this information gap.
DOD contractor disputes decisions are rendered by the
ASBCA or the U.S. Claims Court. Exceptions to this proce-
dure include bid protests which are decided by the Comptrol-
ler General of the General Accounting Office. The General
Services Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) exercises juris-
diction in bid protests related to computer and computer-
related equipment and support materials. [Ref. 8:p. 148]
An analysis of the sustained ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court
decisions with the intent of identifying recurring problems
and/or errors by contracting officers is needed to improve
the acquisition process.
The ASBCA publishes an annual report, addressed to the
Secretary of Defense and Service secretaries, that reports
Board decisions by Service branch, but additional case load
divisions are not segregated by Service [Ref. G] . The FY-85
report is provided as Appendix A. An analysis of the report
will reveal that appeals of default terminations comprise
2 0% of the court's caseload.
Contractors rely very heavily upon ASBCA decisions in
the performance of contract work [Ref. 9:p. 14]. Therefore,
it would behoove the Services to do the same.
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C. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The overall objective of this study is to improve the
Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process as it
relates to areas in which protests occur most frequently.
To accomplish this objective, an analysis of ASBCA and U.S.
Claims Court decisions will be undertaken to determine if
meaningful conclusions to benefit the contracting process
can be identified. This study will concentrate upon the
following questions.
Primary Question :
Can meaningful conclusions be drawn from an analysis of
sustained ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court appeals concerning
Department of Defense contracts which were originally
terminated for default (T for D)
,
but subsequently settled
as terminations for convenience (T for C) as a result of an
agency board or judicial decision?
Subsidiary Questions :
1. What are the principles generally cited for sustaining
a contractor's appeal of a default termination?
2. Once a contract termination is successfully appealed,
what are the contracting officer's options and asso-
ciated considerations?
3. How might the T for D decision process be improved to
reduce the number of successful contractor appeals?
D. STUDY LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research effort is limited to an analysis of
sustained contractor appeals rendered by the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals and the U.S. Claims Court.
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Decisions which were dismissed, denied, or settled cases
were not within the scope of this research, nor were con-
tracting officer/contractor settlements that were reached
prior to a decision by the Board or court examined. The
research was limited to decisions rendered against the U.S.
Navy/Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Defense Logistics
Agency. These four categories represent the vast majority
of the DOD contracts. Omission of the small amount of
contracting done by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
will not impact the analysis or conclusions. Since the
study concentrated on default terminations, bid protests
were not surveyed.
The ASBCA and the U.S. Claims Court consist of guali-
fied attorneys, while the research has a limited legal
background. Any possible biases of the research should not
surface since the in-depth analysis will be based upon the
cases 1 full text as published in the Commerce Clearing House
publication.
The study will be limited to supply contracts and will
exclude research and development (R&D) , construction,
services, and others. To obtain a broad perspective and
enhance the identification of trends or persistence problem
areas, the data will include the four most recent and
complete fiscal years readily available to the researcher:
Fiscal years 1982 through 1985.
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FLITE was utilized to reduce the research data to a
manageable level, therefore it is assumed that FLITE will
identify all, or at least a representative sample, relevant
cases for this analysis. It was assumed that the cases
studied contain the necessary material from which meaningful
recommendations can be derived.
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) and Government Contract Law are the primary sources
of policy and interpretation, since these are the informa-
tion sources relied upon by field contracting officers, in
addition to his lawyer.
Further, it is assumed that all readers will have a
basic understanding of the Government acquisition process
and contract law.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review encompassed the Naval Postgraduate
School's (NPS) main, thesis, and acquisition libraries. The
computerized data base of FLITE and the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) were utilized.
The most successful inquiries proved to be FLITE and
DLSIE. Other than two NPS master's theses completed in
1979, significant, recent research in the area of appealed
disputes is limited. The NPS thesis, Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals: Analysis of Sustained Decisions on
Naw Supply Contract Disputes by Robert Howdyshell [Ref. 9]
researched fiscal year 1978 and proved useful in structuring
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this research effort. The other NPS thesis was the U.S.
General Accounting Office; Analysis of Sustained Decisions
on Department of Defense Contract Related Protests (1975-
1978) by Michael Younker [Ref. 10].
The source data for analysis provided by FLITE, located
at Lowery AFB Denver, Colorado, was outstanding. Without
the superior service attitude, legal knowledge, and data
base expertise of FLITE lawyer Mr. Robert Lundwall, the
amount of data analyzed in this research would have been
extremely limited.
The NPS acquisition library was most useful in providing
ready copies of DLSIE-generated research microfiche while
the NPS main library was most valuable for its current and
back copies of the ASBCA decisions published by Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. , which were utilized for the in-depth
analysis of FLITE-identified cases and for its Government
procurement publications.
F. ORGANIZATION
The general area of study is presented in the Background
section of Chapter I. The Problem Statement justifies the
need for this in-depth research effort. The Objectives were
derived from the problem statement. The primary question
and the three subsidiary questions provide the overall focus
for the analysis and establish the benefit to be obtained
from a solution. The scope of the research is refined in
the Study Limitations and Assumptions. The Literature
15
Review explains the procedures followed in the analysis and
research effort. The Organization section outlines the
presentation of the study.
Chapter II, Framework, delves more deeply into the
financial implications, termination criteria, and the neces-
sary factors involved in a contract termination. Chapter
III identifies the population and techniques used to gather
the research data, while Chapter IV presents case-by-case
synopses and the key principles of law concerning the 15
sustained contract appeals of DOD contractors.
The research analysis is presented in Chapter V. In
Chapter VI, the conclusions of the research and recommenda-
tions for improving the acquisition process are presented,




The acquisition process is the means by which the
Government obtains its needed materials, equipment, facili-
ties, and services necessary to the performance of organi-
zational missions. The contract is the tool used to reach
these ends.
Contract language is developed by the Government,
reviewed and/or modified with the contractor, and ultimate-
ly an agreement (binding contract) is reached as to the per-
formance requirements of each party. Subsequently,
differences in opinions concerning contract interpretation
or changed conditions give rise to a dispute. A dispute is
defined legally as:
A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or
rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one
side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other.
The subject of a litigation; the matter for which a suit
is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation
to jurors are called and witnesses examined. [Ref. 6]
B. DEFAULT TERMINATION
When one party to a contract fails to perform, the other
party has the right of recovering monetary damages for the
breach. A common definition of breach is "a nonperformance
of any contractual duty of immediate importance." [Ref.
8:p. 155]
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The FAR provides the contracting officer with specific
instructions as to the factors to be evaluated when
considering a termination for default. He must review the
situation with acquisition, technical, and legal personnel
prior to deciding upon a no-cost settlement, a termination
for convenience, or one of default [Ref. 3:p. 49-16]. If
the contractor's failure is one of non-delivery by the
contract delivery date or a situation of anticipatory
repudiation is determined, the contracting officer may
terminate immediately. Although it is not required in the
before-mentioned circumstances, issuance of a show cause
letter is encouraged. For other failures, the "cure notice"
must be sent to the contractor, thus allowing a reasonable
amount of time (normally ten days) to respond as to the
remedy for the deficiency. The one exception would be a
situation in which the cure period extended beyond the
delivery date. A knowledgeable contracting officer would
wait for the delivery date to lapse and exercise a default
termination action. If the contracting officer receives no
response within the cure period or decides that the response
is inadequate/inexcusable, the contracting officer has the
right to immediately exercise a termination for default.
[Ref. 2:pp. 710-713] Prior to termination action, it is
recommended that the contracting officer issue a "show
cause" letter to permit a mutually beneficial resolution.
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Terminations for default are treated very differently
depending upon the contract type, i.e., fixed-price of cost
type. Under a fixed-price contract the impact upon the
contractor can be quite severe:
(i) the Government is not liable for the costs of
unaccepted work—the contractor is entitled to
receive payment only for work accepted by the
Government
;
(ii) the Government is entitled to the return of
progress, partial or advance payments;
(iii) the Government has the right but not the duty to
appropriate the contractor's material, inventory,
construction plant and equipment at the site, and,
under supply contracts, his drawings and plans—the
price for the appropriated items to be negotiated;
(iv) the contractor is liable for excess costs of
reprocurement or completion; and
(v) the contractor is liable for actual or liquidated
damages. [Ref. 2:p. 635]
As noted above, one of the principal rights of the Govern-
ment is that of charging the defaulting contractor for the
Government • s excess costs in reprocuring the contracted
items or services. Other costs borne by the contract
include the cost of moving Government- furnished property to
the reprocurement contractor's plant, the expense of added
inspections, and the administrative costs of readvertising
(resolicitation) [Ref. 4:p. 157]. Also, a default
termination may adversely impact the contractor's eligibili-
ty for future Government contracts where past performance is
a consideration in the determination of contractor
responsibility [Ref. 2:p. 635].
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Under a cost reimbursement contract, the financial
impact upon the contractor is much less severe than that
realized under a fixed price contract. The contractor is
reimbursed for all allowable costs, regardless of whether
the work has been accepted by the Government and the
contractor is entitled to a profit on work accepted by the
Government [Ref. 4:p. 637].
The overriding concern of the contracting officer, when
considering a termination action, is what will be "in the
best interests of the Government." Even if the Government
has the right to terminate a contract, it may not be to its
benefit to do so. The FAR provides the following guidance:
(f) the contracting officer shall consider the following
factors in determining whether to terminate for
default:
(1) the terms of the contract and applicable laws
and regulations.
(2) the specific failure of the contractor and the
excuse for the failure.
(3) the availability of the supplies or services
from other sources.
(4) the urgency of the need for the supplies or
services and the period of time reguired to
obtain them from other sources, as compared with
the time delivery could be obtained from the
delinquent contractor.
(5) the degree of essentiality of the contractor in
the Government acguisition program and the
effect of a termination for default upon the
contractor's ability as a supplier under other
contracts.
(6) the effect of the termination for default on the
stability of the contractor to liquidate
20
guaranteed loans, progress payments, or advance
payments
.
(7) any other pertinent facts and circumstances.
[Ref. 3:p. 49-16]
C. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE
The Termination for Convenience clause is a very unique
power the Government has granted itself. It was developed
primarily as a means to terminate war material contracts
when winding down from a major conflict. While the T for C
clause has been used as early as 1863, it came into wide-
spread Government use as a result of The Urgent Deficiency
Appropriation Act of 1917. The Act empowered the President
"to modify, suspend, cancel, or requisition any existing or
future contract for the building, production, or purchase of
ships or related materials" [Ref. 13:pp. 1104-5]. The use
of convenience terminations was further established by The
Contract Settlement Act of 1944, the Armed Services Procure-
ment Act of 1947, and others. Currently, the FAR is the
governing regulation of the Government [Ref. 13:pp. 1106-7].
In no other area of contract law has one party been given
such complete authority to escape from contractual obliga-
tions. The clause gives the Government the broad right to
terminate without cause and limits the contractor's
recovery to costs incurred, profit on work done and costs
of preparing the termination settlement proposal.
Recovery of anticipated profit is precluded. [Ref. 2:p.
773]
Termination for convenience is a Government right that
may be exercised by the contracting officer when it is in
the best interests of the Government. It may not be used to
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benefit, nor penalize, a contractor, i.e., if a contractor
is performing at a loss or above profit expectations, a T
for C action will not be used to change the contractor's
relative financial position in contract performance.
The contractor is to be "made whole," that is, to place
the contractor in the position he would have been in, at
this time, had the contract not been terminated. The
contractor is entitled to all allowable costs incurred in
performing work authorized by the contract; a profit on work
performed, to include work-in-process and finished goods;
and the costs of preparing the termination settlement. In
some instances, the contractor may be reimbursed for contin-
uing costs after settlement that cannot be applied to the
contractor's other business, e.g., specialized eguipment or
buildings purchased or leased specifically for performance
of the terminated contract. Initial costs, such as produc-
tion line set-up costs, costs in terminating subcontractors
and overhead costs are also examples of allowable costs.
D. TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT CONVERSION
The FAR, para. 49.401(b) provides the following remedy
for a T for D that was subseguently determined to be
excusable:
If the contractor can establish, or it is otherwise
determined that the contractor was not in default or that
the failure to perform is excusable; i.e., arose out of
causes beyond the control and without the fault or negli-
gence of the contractor, the default clauses prescribed in
49.503 and located at 52.249 provide that a termination
for default will be considered to have been a termination
22
for the convenience of the Government, and the rights and
obligations of the parties governed accordingly. [Ref.
3:p. 49-15].
E. THE APPEALS PROCESS
Once the contracting officer has terminated the contract
for default, under the Default clause, the contractor may
appeal the decision under the Disputes clause. Generally,
disputes arise when the contractor feels that his claim has
not been dealt with equitably.
The Contracts Disputes Act of 1978 requires all DOD
contract-related claims by the contractor against the
Government, to be submitted to the contracting officer for a
decision [Ref. 12:pp. 6-17]. A claim is defined as follows:
Claim: Right to payment whether or not such right is
reduced to judgement, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgement,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, secured or unsecured. [Ref. 6]
If a resolution of mutual agreement is not reached with
the contracting officer the contractor can pursue an
administrative resolution by appealing to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the contractor can
pursue a judicial decision by appealing to the U.S. Claims
Court. Once the contractor has chosen the forum for his
appeal (ASBCA or U.S. Claims Court), he is precluded from
changing forums [Ref. 2:p. 947]. The ASBCA decisions are
final, except:
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In the event of an appeal by a contractor or the Govern-
ment from a decision of any agency board pursuant to
Section 9 [41 USCA S. 607], notwithstanding any contract
provision, regulation, or rules of law to the contrary,
the decision of the agency board on any question of law
shall not be final or conclusive, but the decision on any
question of fact shall be final and conclusive and shall
not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, or
arbitrary, or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to
necessarily imply bad faith, or if such decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. [Ref. 2:p. 956]
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, as amended,
gave the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction to hear Government or contractor appeals of
ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court decisions. The U.S. Claims
Court rulings will be overturned only if the findings of
fact are clearly erroneous. [Ref. 2:pp. 956-7]
The appeals process is an expensive procedure for both
parties, thus an appeal of a contracting officer's final
decision is not undertaken lightly or arbitrarily. "There
is also evidence that contract type, complexity of the
contract, the contractor size and location are indicators of




A. POPULATION AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The population under consideration in this study
included 15 disputes of DOD supply contracts where the ASBCA
rendered sustained decisions during fiscal years 1982, 1983,
1984, and 1985. The annual fiscal year Reports of Transac-
tions and Proceedings of the ASBCA were obtained by the
researcher from the ASBCA for the applicable fiscal years.
Fiscal year 1985 is provided as Appendix A.
The researcher felt that four years would provide a
population from which a representative number of T for D's
could be extracted. Fiscal years 1982 through 1985 were
chosen to reflect recent data and for the ease of access to
the complete text in the Commerce Clearing House publication
of ASBCA decisions.
Due to the small magnitude, less than three percent of
the other agencies for whom the ASBCA rendered decisions,
the inclusion of these agencies' cases in the total caseload
totals will not distort the illustrative significance of
data when total caseload is used as a base.
As stated earlier, the courts can render one of the
following decisions: sustained, denied, settled, or dismis-
sed. Denied and dismissed decisions represent cases in
which the Government actions were valid. Although subjected
25
TABLE 1
TOTAL ASBCA APPEALS BY KIND OF PROCUREMENT
Type FY8 2 % FY83 % FY84 % FY85 %
Supply 299 32 401 35 437 34 427 34
Construction 358 38 427 38 515 39 504 40
R&D 34 3 13 1 18 1 16 1
Service 212 23 236 21 246 19 247 20
Surplus Sale 20 2 24 2 16 15-
Other 15 2 3_0 3 74 6 66 5
*Total 938 100% 1131 100% 1306 100% 1265 100%
Source: Researcher's summarization of annual ASBCA
Report of Transactions and Proceedings
*Represent totals from the three Services, Defense Logistics
Agency, and other. The other cases decided by the ASBCA,
representing less than three percent of total appeals,
include such agencies as Office of Personnel Management,
Defense Mapping Agency, Health and Human Services, and
Defense Nuclear Agency.
to substantial proceedings, the settled decision is the
compromise of both parties' positions. Therefore, an
analysis of the sustained contractor appeals was identified
as fruitful ground for uncovering Government errors during
contract performance.
The cases that were terminated by the Government for
reasons of contractor default were chosen for analysis
because these cases represent a disproportionately large
segment of the ASBCA annual caseload. Of the 55 principal
contract clauses or issues involved in disputes cited by the
ASBCA, T for D appeals consistently average over 15%. The
Changes clause was cited nearly as often, while all other
26
clauses/issues were cited much less frequently. Appendix A
provides detailed data summaries.
B. DATA COLLECTION PLAN
To reduce the thousands of annual cases to a manageable
level, the services of FLITE were utilized to provide
listings of the ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court decisions in
which the words "supplies" or "supply contract" and
"termination for default" appeared in the FLITE synopsis.
Fiscal years 1982 through 1985 were analyzed. FLITE is a
computerized research service operated by the Judge Advocate
General's Department, U.S. Air Force in Denver Colorado.
The search of U.S. Claims Court produced no pertinent
cases, while the ASBCA search produced 132 default termina-
tion cases. Through individual case analysis, the
researcher reduced the number of cases by identifying those
with sustained decisions of contractor appeals for the three
services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) . Decisions
involving other DOD agencies, non-supply contracts, Govern-
ment and contractor appeals of previous decisions, contrac-
tor appeals of excess reprocurement costs, and dismissed,
denied, and settled cases were eliminated. The 132 cases
were reduced to a population of 15 cases, in which a con-
tractor terminated for default in a supply contract was
converted to a termination for convenience by the Board.
During the literature search, it was discovered that one
researcher questioned the completeness of the FLITE listings
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[Ref. 9: p. 29]. Therefore, to validate the research tech-
nique, the researcher chose to compare the FLITE data to the
Board Of Contract Appeals Decisions for one sample fiscal
year. The indices in the three FY-85 volumes cited 105
cases involving default, of which only four cases (BCA No.
18498, 18043, 18059, and 17878) fit the research parameters.
These four cases correlated with the four cases identified
through analysis of data provided by FLITE. Thus, the
researcher is confident of the completeness of the
population selected.
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IV. SYNOPSIS OF SUSTAINED APPEALS
A. GENERAL
An in-depth analysis was completed on the fifteen cases
cited in Chapter III. The cases are arranged into the three
categories, cited by the contracting officer as the primary
reason for terminating the contract. On each sequentially
numbered case, the ASBCA's principal justification for
converting the default termination into one of the conveni-
ence for the Government is provided.
The presentation on each of the fifteen cases is formu-
lated around a three step approach. It commences with a
summation of the Findings of Fact and follows with an
explanation of the Board's Decision. The third step further
amplifies the Principle of Law cited by the Board for
sustaining the contractor's appeal. Any divergence between
the ruling and the current policies, regulations, or
previous interpretations of law is presented. An analysis,
based upon the cases and additional information provided in
this chapter, is presented in Chapter V.
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B. CASE ANALYSIS
1 . Category One: Failure to Make Delivery
a. Case l 1 Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract required an
October 1974 delivery of 57 rebuilt aircraft engines to the
U.S. Air Force. No deliveries were made in October. By a 9
October agreement, amended 20 November 1974, 25 engines were
scheduled for delivery in November. An agreement for Decem-
ber deliveries was made on 07 November and twice amended.
While the contractor made partial deliveries, the deliveries
were becoming increasingly delinquent. Due to the contrac-
tor's failure to meet required schedules, the Government
issued "show cause" letter on 20 December 1974. On 07
January 1975, the Government agreed to a February delivery
schedule of 56 engines. On 29 January, another "show cause"
notice was issued, prompted by non-delivery of 41 of the 55
engines scheduled for December.
On 2 9 January, the Government withdrew its
procurement quality assurance (PQAP) activities from the
contractor's plant, due to six of seven engines failing
critical inspections. On 07 February, the contract was
modified with new delivery dates of March through August
1975 for the October and November delinquent deliveries.
The Government completed a quality audit on 20 February in
185-3 BCA: 18,498. Gary Aircraft Corp. ASBCA No.
20,534. October 17, 1975 Contract No. F4 1608-74-D-1645
.
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which it disassembled a rebuilt engine in the contractor's
plant. Forty-seven defects were discovered. The next day,
21 February 197 5, the contractor corresponded corrective
actions it had taken to eliminate the quality problems.
The Government's quality assurance (QA)
representative responded, on 2 5 February, that the correc-
tive actions were unsatisfactory and advised the adminis-
trative contracting officer (ACO) that the contractor's QA
system was "out of control."
On 28 February, the ACO recommended immedi-
ate termination under the Default clause of the contract.
However, on the same day, the procuring contracting officer
(PCO) approved a contract modification that increased the
number of engines to be rebuilt under this contract. Notice
of termination for default was forwarded by the ACO on 05
March 1975. The basis of the termination was the failure to
make the December, January, and February deliveries.
(2) Decision . During the course of the
contract, the Government's conduct toward the contractor was
clearly inconsistent with an intention to terminate the
contract for default. No deliveries were made in October
1974, but partial deliveries were received in November and
December. The contractor was advised of QA problems and
took measures to correct the deficiencies. On 28 February,
the Government increased the quantity of engines on the
contract and, thus, further encouraged contractor
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performance and implied that the deliveries were not "of the
essence." Appeal sustained.
(3) Point of Law . No new policy or interpreta-
tion of law was presented in the case. It clearly reaffirms
that the Government cannot encourage performance of a
contractor who is repeatedly late with deliveries and/or
takes corrective actions to problems noted by the Govern-
ment, and then terminate for default.
a. Case 2 2 Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
(1) Findings of Fact . In November 1983, the
contractor was awarded a contract to supply 244 airport
light hoods on or before 29 June 1984. Two months after
award, the item manager urged termination of the contract
because the current supply would last at least ten years
considering the declining demand rate. This action was
infeasible due to the high termination costs to the Govern-
ment it would entail.
On 23 July 1984, past the required delivery
date, the Government QA representative inspected and
rejected a lot consisting of 83 hoods, for excessive burrs.
On 26 July, the contractor responded by correcting the
problems through disassembly, removal of the burrs, and
reassembly of the hoods. The QA representative reinspected
and approved the hoods.
2 85-2 BCA 17,878. Multi-Electric Mfg., Inc. ASBCA No.
30,055. January 29, 1985. Contract No. DLA4000-84-C-0248
.
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reassembly of the hoods. The QA representative reinspected
and approved the hoods.
At the close of business, on 27 July, the
company closed for a two week vacation. A "show cause"
letter was issued 30 July for failure to deliver by the 29
June delivery date. Two days later a response from the
contractor acknowledged receipt of the notice; advised that
the plant was on a two week vacation; and relayed the fact
that the entire shipment was ready for inspection. After
several unsuccessful attempts, the Government's QA represen-
tative did contact the plant on 13 August, but was told the
material was not ready for his inspection. The contract was
terminated for default the following day.
(2) Decision . It was clear that the contractor
failed to comply with the 29 June 1984 contract delivery
date. The Government's inspection on 2 3 July and its state-
ments as to the corrective actions required were relied upon
by the contractor as evidence to continue its performance
and effectively waived the 29 June delivery date. No new
delivery was established, thus the contract could not be
terminated for a nonexistent due date.
(3) Point of Law . When the Government acts in
a manner as to encourage performance past the contract
delivery date, it has waived its right to terminate for non-
delivery [Ref. 2: p. 689]. A key ingredient to this deter-
mination is the "contractor's reliance" upon the Government
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actions of inactions to continue performance. To satisfy
this requirement, the contractor needs to continue the
performance necessary to contract compliance, that is to
say, the contractor continues to act in a manner conducive
to satisfactory delivery of the items [Ref. 2:p. 689].
c. Case 3 3 Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
(1) Findings of Fact . On 22 August 1978, the
contractor was awarded a supply contract for incremental
deliveries of wet weather ponchos. The Government was late
in furnishing patterns and the delivery dates were extended
to allow for the Government's tardiness. The contractor
experienced difficulty in obtaining the coated fabric from a
supplier and was granted an additional extension. The
contractor continued to have problems with the supplier and
sent an outside expert to the supplier's plant to assist.
The supplier problem precipitated slow deliveries and
resulted in the Government issuance of a "show cause" letter
on September 12, 1979.
A meeting between the Government and the
contractor was held on September 21, at which time the
contractor proposed a revised delivery schedule. Addition-
ally, he advised that the supplier problems were improving,
additional material was to be procured from another proven
3 83-2 BCA: 16,842. Cecile Industries, Inc. ASBCA
Nos. 24,600 and 27,625. September 22, 1983. Contract No.
DLA 100-78-C-1125.
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supplier; that additional facilities were being opened; and
that the contractor had hired a new general manager. The
Government did not dispute the excusability of any delays,
but was solely concerned with receiving deliveries. The
Government did advise that it was retaining all rights to
terminate, but did not advise that it was going to do so.
On October 17, 1979, the Government made
suggested changes to the proposed revised delivery schedule.
The contractor agreed to these changes. The contracting
officer was dissatisfied with the $6,000 price reduction as
a consideration for revising the schedule, but did not
communicate this to the contractor. With the Government's
knowledge, the contractor arranged for the new supplier.
The contracting officer decided to reject
the proposed revised delivery schedule and to partially
terminate the contract for default. In her haste to
complete the day's work before a three day weekend, she
mistakenly advised the company via a telegram using language
which followed that of a termination for convenience.
The contractor understood the correspon-
dence to be a partial termination for convenience. Upon
receiving the T for D notice in the form of a contract
modification, the contractor responded that since the tele-
gram terminated the same line items for convenience, the
Government can not, subsequently, terminate for default.
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The Government resolicited the items delin-
quent from the terminated contract. The terminated
contractor was the lowest of six bidders. The Government
considered the terminated contractor nonresponsive based
upon the unsatisfactory performance of the previous and two
other contracts and upon receipt of a pre-award survey
citing lack of production capacity and labor resources.
When the terminated contractor failed to file for a
Certificate of Competency with the Small Business
Administration, his bid was rejected as nonresponsive.
Excess reprocurement costs left the terminated contractor
over $3 00,000 indebted to the Government.
(2) Decision . By not exercising its right to
terminate for default within a reasonable time, the
Government waived that right. The Government urged the
defaulting contractor to do everything possible to increase
deliveries and made several revisions to delivery schedules,
thus relaying the fact that delivery of the ponchos was not
"of the essence." If time was of the essence, the only
other issue was for the contracting officer to consider if
the items were available from another source within the
delivery schedules required of the contract. The Board
finds no evidence of this concern by the contracting offi-
cer, but merely a dissatisfaction with the contractor's
proposed price reductions. There was a history of late
deliveries, revisions of delivery dates, discussions,
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negotiations for price reductions coupled with the
Government's encouragement of continued performance.
(3) Point of Law . The result of this case is
similar to the previous cases, where the Government's
inaction in exercising its rights to terminate and its
continued encouragement to perform after the delivery date
were inconsistent with its actions of subsequent termination
for default.
Having failed to exercise its right to
terminate for delinquent deliveries, the Government essen-
tially waived the contract delivery schedule. Without the
establishment of a new delivery schedule, there can be no
default based upon a non-existent schedule. [Ref. 2:p. 689]
d. Case 4 4 Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract was for
delivery of a jacketed stainless steel 525 gallon tank in
accordance with the Government-furnished drawing. The
contract schedule and the drawing provided were inconsistent
and resulted in a considerable delay in the Government's
approval of the contractor's shop drawings, a condition of
the contract. The contract was administered in such a way
as to lead the contractor to believe that time was not "of
the essence," as evidenced by two delivery date extensions.
4 83-l BCA 16,398. Pacific Coast Welding & Machine,
Inc. ASBCA No. 26,105. March 7, 1983. Contract No. 200-
80-0017.
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The contract was currently in default. The Government was
aware of the subcontractor's continued performance in
providing material for the dimpled jacket portion of the
tank, after an extended delivery date had passed. The
Government argued that it was aware of the subcontractor's
continued performance, but did not interpret that as
continued performance by the prime contractor.
(2) Decision . The ASBCA decision was summariz-
ed in an except from the historic "De Vito decision":
The necessary element of an election by the non-
defaulting party to waive default in delivery under a
contract are (1) failure to terminate within a reasonable
time after the default under circumstances indicating
forbearance, and (2) reliance by the contractor on the
failure to terminate the continued performance by him
under the contract, with the Government's knowledge and
implied or express consent.
The continued performance by a subcontrac-
tor is interpreted as continued performance by the prime
contractor because the subcontractor is doing the prime's
work. The Government's delay in terminating was beyond a
reasonable period of forbearance and therefore waived its
right to terminate for default based upon delinquent
delivery.
(3) Point of Law . The Government has a
reasonable period of time in which to investigate the facts
and determine the actions required that would be in the best
interests of the Government. Within this forbearance
period, the Government can terminate the contract for
default. The judgment call is in determining the period of
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reasonable forbearance. It varies, depending upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. [Ref. 2:p. 688] If the
contractor continues to perform, with the Government's
knowledge, the Government is obligated to act expeditiously
in making its decision to terminate [Ref. 2:p. 689].
e. Case 5 5 Unconscionably Priced Contract
(1) Findings of Fact . A contractor mistakenly
submitted a bid on only one part of a two-part seat
assembly. He had previously been awarded ten contracts for
part one and one contract for part two, but the two-part
assembly had never been procured as a complete unit.
The contractor's bid was 33%, 72%, and 93%
lower than the second, third and fourth lowest bidders,
respectively. The ACO telephoned the contractor to request
he check his price quotation, but there was no mention of
the Government's suspicion of bidder's "mistake" or the wide
disparity between his bid and the bids received for the
other competitors. The contractor had had a contract within
the last year for part one of the assembly. His bid on this
contract agreed with the unit price bid on this previous
award
.
The contractor was awarded the contract and
discovered his error upon receiving the written contract.
The ACO refused his request for a price increase, but the
584-3 BCA 17,599. Manistique Tool & Mfg Co. ASBCA No.
29164. August 14, 1984. Contract No. N00104-83-C-4041.
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contractor continued manufacturing of part one of the two-
part assembly.
(2) Decision . The contractor's mistake was due
to a misreading of the contract specifications, not due to a
mistake in business judgment. The bid verification
procedure performed by the Government was inadeguate. To
force the contractor to comply with all the contract provi-
sions would be "unconscionable." The contract is
enforceable to the extent of supplying the one part upon
which the contractor's bid was based. The contractor is
entitled to recovery of all its reasonable costs incurred in
supplying the one part of the assembly.
(3) Point of Law . The issue of unilateral
mistake must be a clerical or arithmetical error, or a
misreading of specifications, but does not extend to
mistakes in business judgment. [Ref. 2:p. 229]
The Government is reguired to notify
bidders of suspected errors in their bids. The FAR provides
the following guidance:
After the opening of bids, contracting officers shall
examine all bids for mistakes. In cases of apparent
mistakes and cases where the contracting officer has
reason to believe that a mistake may have been made, the
contracting shall reguest from the bidder a verification
of the bid, calling attention to the suspected mistake.
[Ref. 3:p. 14-13]
The Government must have "knowledge or
reason to know" of the mistake [Ref. 2:p. 232]. In the
verification process, the contracting officer must call
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attention to the suspected mistake and disclose the
particular reasons which led to his suspicion of a mistake
[Ref. 3:p. 14-14]. The rationale for unconscionability is
not to allow the Government to "get something for nothing."
A final point on "unconscionability":
If the contractor's mistake results in a contract
which is grossly imbalanced, relief may be granted on the
theory of unconscionability even if the contractor had
verified the bid after appropriate reguest for verifica-
tion, 53 Comp. Gen. [Ref. 2:p. 236]
f. Case 6 6 Government Hindrance
(1) Findings of Fact . The case involved the
default termination of contracts 1205 and 1628, however, the
case hinges upon a third contract, 749. The contractor was
performing all three new contracts. The delivery date of
the two terminated contracts was September 1979. Contract
749 was solicited and awarded for delivery of "chlorinated
lime" to be used as a deodorizer. Subsequent to award, and
just prior to delivery, the Government contented that the
material required certification by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for reason of its classification as
a pesticide. Thus, the Government would not receipt for nor
make a payment on contract 749. The Government had relied
upon an outdated reference in arriving at this conclusion.
Several months later, the Government
conceded that the EPA certification was not applicable to
682-2 BCA 15,948. Spiritual Scented Sky Products.
ASBCA No. 24,507. July 14, 1982. Contract No. DLA400-79-C-
1205.
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the deodorizing compound. Consequently, the Government
authorized payment for contract 749 in late October and,
almost simultaneously, issued a default termination on the
two other contracts. The contractor contended that the
erroneous withholding of payment on contract 749 led to his
nonperformance on the two contracts.
(2) Decision . The Board dismissed the Govern-
ment's argument that the withdrawing of the EPA certifica-
tion was a contract waiver of the EPA requirement vice an
error in requiring the certification. The Government had no
right to delay acceptance and withhold payment. The
contractor is not responsible for excess reprocurement
costs.
(3) Point of Law . The contractor is generally
required to assume the risk of providing sufficient funds to
perform a contract. Failure of expected loans to material-
ize, for instance, would not excuse performance. However,
the contractor will be granted relief when the lack of
financing is caused by wrongful Government actions. [Ref.
2:p. 414] The contractor must establish that the Govern-
ment's actions caused the financing problems [Ref. 2:pp.
414-415] .
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g. Case 7 7 Unusually Severe Weather
(1) Findings of Fact . The contractor was
required to deliver 99,999 board feet of specially treated
scaffold planks on or before 28 January 1981. The contrac-
tor's supplier had adequate logs, but was delayed in
transporting the logs from the forest to the mill by unusual
rain and heavy wind damage to the logging road. The Govern-
ment rejected this claim after its research revealed that
the conditions experienced were normal. The Government
resolicited and awarded to a reprocurement contractor.
(2) Decision . The Government erroneously
relied upon weather data for the lumber mill area and not
the logging road areas, which had experienced unusually
severe weather. The logging roads were washed-out, mired in
mud, and blocked with trees blown down by storms. The
contractor's appeal was sustained.
(3) Point of Law . This case exhibits a new
interpretation of "unusually severe weather," i.e., exacting
the location of performance. "Unusually severe weather is
weather that is abnormal compared to the past weather at the
same location for the same time of year" {Ref. 2:p. 398].
The two key points in this area of law are the "place of
performance" and the "effect upon performance." The place
of performance was not the lumber mill, which had normal
782-l BCA 15,500. J&M Lumber Co. ASBCA No. 25,951.
December 10, 1981. Contract No. DLA720-80-C-0910.
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weather, but rather, the logging roads located in nearby
low-lying areas. This area, close to the coast, had experi-
enced hurricane-force storms. The second key is the effect
upon performance. One day of unusually severe weather may
excusably delay performance for months, e.g., the storm may
damage existing structures and cause the site to be mired in
mud for an extended period of time. [Ref. 2:p. 399]
2 . Category Two: First Article
a. Case 8° Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract provided
for delivery of 988 portable multifuel space heaters for use
in vehicles, such as personnel carriers. First article
approval was required. The manufacture of the heater had
previously been a sole source procurement to Hunter Mfg. Co.
The contractor obtained a Hunter heater and performed a
reverse engineer effort. Minor changes and improvements
were incorporated and the first article test was approved.
Subsequently, the contractor received
several unrelated contracts and, due to plant capacity con-
straints, decided to accept an offer from Hunter to produce
the heaters. The Government contract required the first
article and production units to be manufactured by the same
source. The Government QA representative, who had approved
the assembling and testing of the first articles at the
8 82-2 BCA 15,981. Precision Products. ASBCA No.
25,280. July 27, 1982. Contract No. DAAK01-78-C-1098
.
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contractor's plant, made routine visits to the plant in
performing his contract oversight duties. Incident to
contract performance, the Government was allowed 60 days to
review the draft copy of the instruction manuals for the
heaters. The smooth manuals were required to accompany the
heater deliveries. The Government completed its review
seven months after receipt of the initial drafts from the
contractor. When the procuring contracting officer became
aware that Hunter had been subcontracted to produce the
heaters and that the deliveries were overdue, he terminated
the contract for default. The Government reprocured the
heaters from Hunter Mfg. Co.
(2) Decision . The delay in deliveries was
excusable and due to the Government's excessive review
period of the manuals while the heaters were ready for
shipment. Although the first article and production unit's
place of manufacture clearly violated the terms of the
contract, the Government waived its right to terminate due
to the Government's awareness of this fact. The Govern-
ment's QA representative is "the eyes and ears" of the
contracting officer. He was aware, or should have been
aware, that the production was not taking place at the
contractor's plant.
(3) Point of Law . The law books are filled
with cases that deal with the contracting officer's techni-
cal representative, many decisions of which are
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contradictory. The focus is upon whether knowledge by a
contracting officer's representative is "imputed" to be
knowledge by the contracting officer. It is applicable when
the "nature of the relationship between the authorized
person and the representatives establishes a presumption
that the authorized person will be informed" [Ref. 2:p. 39].
b. Case9 9 Government Hindrance
(1) Findings of Fact . The two principal con-
tracts called for manufacturing PRC-77 radios. The other
sixteen contracts were for the same item and resulted pri-
marily from options for additional quantities and the award
of foreign military sale contracts. The radios were
required to be tested on the Government-furnished test
equipment, Special Automatic Test Equipment (SATE) . The
knowledgeable contractor experienced severe difficulties in
certifying the radios on SATE, as had several other contrac-
tors who had used it. The U.S. Army also reneged on an
agreement to allow a single first article test to satisfy
the two contracts. The extensive problems associated with
the use of SATE caused repeated rejections of the first
articles, extensive delays, and eventual termination of the
two contracts for default. Those default terminations
precipitated the default terminations of the other sixteen
contracts.
9 84-3 BCA 17,543. Bristol Electronics Corp. ASBCA
Nos. 24792, 24929, 25135 through 25150.
46
(2) Decision . The Government's refusal to make
equitable adjustments for the contractor's problems derived
from the use of the Government-furnished defective test
equipment was directly responsible for the contractor's
default on the eighteen contracts.
(3) Point of Law . Several issues arise in this
case, the two most significant being (1) the Government's
implied duty not to hinder (discussed in Cases 6, 8, and 14)
by its refusal to make a fair and equitable adjustment, and
(2) the Government's responsibility to provide the test
equipment "suitable for the intended use" [REf. 14:p. 655].
"A few cases have held it [Government-furnished property] is
covered on the theory that defective Government-furnished
property is the equivalent of a defective specification"
[Ref . 2:p. 282]
.
c. Case 10 10 Government Encouraged Continued
Performance
|
(1) Findings of Fact . The contractor was to
supply 574 each hoisting slings. The contractor was late in
submission of its first article and the Government intended
to terminate for default. When the company contacted the
contracting officer to advise that the first article would
be delivered in one or two days, the contracting officer
advised the contractor to "Put that in writing."
1085-2 BCA 18,043. King's Mfg. Co. Inc. ASBCA No.
27,201. April 3, 1985. Contract No. N00104-81-C-K691.
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(2) Decision . By her statement, the contract-
ing officer encouraged continued performance after the
delivery date of the first article. This encouragement of
performance is legally interpreted as a waiver of the
delivery date. With no new delivery date, the contract
cannot be terminated for non-delivery until a new date has
been established.
(3) Point of Law . (Same as cases 1, 2, 3 and
8).
d. Case ll": No First Article Approval Clause
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract called for
delivery of fiberglass blade spacers that are installed on
compressors in wind tunnels. The contractor failed to
deliver an acceptable first article and, subsequently,
failed to deliver a first production run sample. The
contractor consistently advised the Government of progress
and proposed solutions. The Government's response was one
of encouragement to performance, even after the contractor
was in default.
The contract contained no standard First
Article Approval clause or equivalent clause under which a
default termination could be exercised for failure to
deliver acceptable first articles. Contractor performance,
with Government encouragement, continued beyond the delivery
1]
-85-2 BCA 18,059. Composites Horizons. ASBCA No.
25,529 and 26,471. April 18, 1985. Contract No. F40650-79-
C-0007.
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date. The contract was terminated for failure to timely
provide the first article and initial production for
testing.
(2) Decision . Having omitted the First Article
Approval clause from the contract, the Government could not
cite lack of an acceptable first article submission as
justification to terminate the contract for default. The
Government's encouragement of performance beyond the
delivery date is, in fact, a waiver of the delivery
schedule.
(3) Point of Law . Similar to Cases 1, 2, 3,
10.
e. Case 12 12 Government Hindrance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract was for
forty-six printed circuit boards. Sixty-six drawing numbers
were referenced in the solicitation, however, these drawings
were not distributed as part of the solicitation. The
contractor realized this, but felt it was unnecessary for
submission of his bid.
Subsequent to contract award, the
Government was unable to locate the drawings. The Govern-
ment contends that, having discovered that the solicitation
lacked the referenced drawings, the contractor should have
notified the Government of that fact.
12 84-3 BCA 17,677. Amplitronics, Inc. ASBCA No.
29,629. September 13, 1984. Contract No. N00104-82-C-K723
.
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(2) Decision . The Government was correct in
its contention that failure to notify the Government of the
omission of drawings amounted to the contractor's assumption
of increased risk. However, the contractor acted in
accordance with the Government's established policy of never
including drawings with solicitations, but furnishing the
necessary drawings after award. The Government agreed that
the drawings were necessary for production of the circuit
boards. The contract is converted to a termination for the
convenience of the Government and remanded to the parties
for negotiation as to monetary settlement costs.
(3) Point of Law . This case has yielded a new
interpretation of solicitation requirements and rests upon
the Government's implied duty "not to hinder." The Govern-
ment was not in possession of the required drawings and
sought to transfer additional performance risk to the
contractor. If an action by the Government is required for
contract performance, lack of that action is a breach of its
implied duty to cooperate. [Ref. 2:p. 212]
f. Case 13 1 -* Substantial Compliance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract called for
delivery of 126 radio interference filters. The first
articles failed a temperature and immersion test (the units
leaked) . The units passed essentially all other
13 82-1 BCA 15,505. FIL-COIL Co. Inc. ASBCA Nos.
26,101 and 26,329. December 11, 1981. Contract No. DLA900-
80-C-0284.
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requirements. The contractor responded to a "show cause"
notice that the problem had been identified and corrective
steps had been taken to correct the defects. A new delivery
was negotiated.
In discussions with the contracting
officer, not in the presence of the Government's engineer
responsible for technical approval, the contractor was led
to believe that resubmission for first article testing would
be necessary only for the temperature and immersion test.
Minor deficiencies, again, resulted from the testing
procedure. The Government terminated for default based upon
the contractor's inability to produce an acceptable first
article.
(2) Decision . Although the filters submitted
for testing did not fully comply with the contract specifi-
cations, they did substantially demonstrate the contractor's
ability to perform the contract. The Government was not
obligated to accept the non-conforming items, but was obli-
gated to allow the contractor an opportunity to cure the
deficiencies.
(3) Point of Law . A failure to deliver
acceptable first articles or prototype is not a failure to
deliver supplies. The purpose of submitting a first article
is to demonstrate the contractor's technical ability to
comply with the contract. The "substantial compliance"
principle is the focal point with first article testing.
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Major deficiencies in first article testing require a "cure
period" to permit the contractor to correct defects. [Ref.
2:pp. 655-657]
g. Case 14 14 Substantial Compliance
(1) Findings of Fact . The contract provided
for delivery of eighteen 20-mm gun booster fitting assem-
blies. The first articles were rejected for relatively
minor defects. The contractor corrected all the noted
defects and submitted a second first article. This time it
was rejected for defects that were not noted on the first
testing and were minor in nature. An ambiguous specifica-
tion on a drawing and an erroneous measuring technique
performed by the Government inspector contributed to the
rejection of the second submission. The Government
terminated for default due to the contractor's inability to
furnish the required first article.
(2) Decision . The defects were minor in nature
and could have been remedied quickly and at a small cost.
The purpose of the "first article" requirement is to
demonstrate the contractor's understanding and "Know-How."
The Board summarized concisely:
Deficiencies in a first article that are correctable
in production are not a valid basis for an outright
disapproval of a first article, and in recognition of
this, the first article approval clause expressly provides
for conditional approval.
14 82-2 BCA 16,830. Dunrite Tool & Die, Inc. ASBCA No.
27,538. August 23, 1983. Contract No. F09603-80-C-4500
.
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(3) Point of Law . No new laws or interpreta-
tions of established law were demonstrated in this case,
merely a reiteration of the principles presented in the
previous case.
3 . Category Three; Anticipatory Repudiation
a. Case 15 15 Unfounded Unequivocable Manifestation
of Contractor's Intention not to Perform
(1) Findings of Fact . A Blanket Purchase
Agreement (BPA) called for the supplying of beef to the
commissary system operated by the U.S. Forces in Europe.
Defense Subsistence Region Europe (DRSE) solicited offers
and accepted the bid of Martin Suchan. Contract awards
preceded deliveries by only two or three weeks. The
contractor had never received such a large contract for
delivery of beef. This required the contractor to increase
his credit line and to place an unusually large order with
his supplier. The rising beef prices prompted negotiations
between the contractor and his supplier. These complica-
tions eroded the contracting officer's confidence in the
contractor's ability to deliver. Through the post-award
discussions and difficulties the contractor kept the
contracting officer apprised of developments; stated he was
confident that he would resolve his problems; but refused to
state unequivocally that he would not deliver the beef.
1583-1 BCA 16,323. Martin Suchan. ASBCA No. 22,251.
February 8, 1983. Contract No. DSA 139-76-A00002
.
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In consideration of all the facts available
and his interpretation of the contractor's statements, the
contracting officer terminated the contract for default due
to the contractor's "stated inability to deliver." Subse-
quently, but prior to the first delivery date, his credit
line was increased and his supplier was in a position to
provide the beef.
(2) Decision . As stated in the Dingley v. Oler
case of 1886,
The hallmark of anticipatory repudiation is that there
must be a "definite and unequivocal manifestation of
intention on the part of repudiator that he will not render
the promised performance when the time fixed for it in the
contract arrives." Corbin on Contracts § 973. Therefore,
to constitute an anticipatory repudiation the alleged
repudiators ' words of conduct must manifest a "positive,
unconditional, and unequivocal declaration of fixed purpose
not to perform the contract in any event or at any time."
The record established without a doubt that
Suchan did not tell the contracting officer that he would
not perform in accordance with the terms of the contract.
The contractor's actions in informing the contracting
officer of difficulties can not be interpreted as an
inability or refusal to perform.
(3) Point of Law . The "anticipatory repudia-
tion" doctrine rests upon the contractor's "definite and
unequivocal manifestation" not to perform in accordance with
the terms of the contract [Ref. 2:p. 678]. This occurs when
the contractor:
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1. Refuses to perform.
2. Expresses intention not to perform.
3. States inability to performance or the facts clearly
show inability to perform. [Ref. 14 :p. 528]
The doctrine is founded upon the Uniform
Commercial Code and holds that to wait until the appointed
time of contract nonperformance would "unduly penalize" the
buyer when it appears the contractor cannot or will not
perform. [Ref. 15:p. 528]
The issues involved in an anticipatory
repudiation often require difficult judgmental decisions.
For example, a contractor's appeal was sustained, 71-1 BAC §
8,700 (1971), when the contractor filed for bankruptcy and
failed to commence work as promised. The bankruptcy trustee
stated that the contractor had the necessary equipment and
capability to perform. In another case the contractor's
appeal was sustained, 82-2 BCA § 15,881 (1982), when the
contractor sent a letter informing the contracting officer
that financial difficulties had forced him to suspend
manufacturing operations, but that he was "actively trying
to resolve the financial problems." In one particularly
interesting case, 71-1 BCA 8690 (1971) , the "contractor used
abusive language to a Government official, agreed that the
contract should be cancelled, and stated that he neither
cared about nor wanted the work." This contractor's appeal
was also sustained by the Board. [Ref. 2: p. 685]
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V. ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED APPEALS
A. INTRODUCTION
The information from Chapter IV will be analyzed for the
reasons the contracting officer cited in terminating the
contract for default and the justifications cited by the
Board in sustaining the contractors' appeals. Refer to
Table 2 for a summary of this information. Due to an
overlap between Chapter IV 's Category 1 (Failure to Make
Delivery) and Category 2 (First Article) , the first section
is appropriately titled "Failure to Deliver." After a brief
presentation of the magnitude of the total "failure to
deliver" aspects of the sample cases, this chapter presents
an analysis of the major principles, cited by the ASBCA, for
sustaining the contractors' appeals. The format of this
section is a discussion of the principles of law and the
associated requirements followed by a discussion of the
particular actions in the cases which correlate to these
principles. The third area of analysis focuses upon the
individual characteristics of the cases, i.e., contract
size, unit prices of supplies, and the time between the T
for D action and the Board's decision. These data are
summarized in Table 3.
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B. FAILURE TO DELIVER
The default clauses identify three different grounds for
terminating a contract for default:
1. Failure to deliver the product or complete the work of
service within the stated time period,
2. Failure to make progress in prosecuting the work which
endangers timely completion, and
3. Breach of "other provisions" of the contract. [Ref.
B:p. 640]
In addition to the three justifications listed above,
"failure to proceed" and "anticipatory repudiation" are
common law remedies to terminate for default [Ref. B:p. 640]
Referring to Table 2, a combination of Categories 1
(Failure To Make Delivery) and 2 (First Article) represent
the total number of sample contracts that were terminated
for not delivering the requirements on or before the
contract delivery date. This total represents over 93
percent, fourteen out of fifteen, of the sample. The one
other case, Case 15, involved an anticipatory repudiation.
It is noteworthy to observe that cases which cited the other
three justifications (failure to make progress, breach of
"other provisions," and failure to proceed) were not found
in the sample.
C. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONVERSION TO "T FOR C"
1. Government Encouraged Continued Performance
Where the Government allows a contractor to continue
performance past the delivery date, it surrenders its
57
TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF THE BASIS OF THE DEFAULT
TERMINATION TO THE REASON FOR THE CONVERSION
BASIS FOR TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
ARMED SERVICES
BOARD OF CON- 1. Failure 2. First 3. Antici-
TRACT APPEALS to Make Arti- patory
































Source: Researcher's summarization of ASBCA research
cases
.
Note: The numbers represent individual case numbers, not
quantities
.
The numbers in parentheses represent secondary
reasons for conversion to T for C and are not counted
in computing the percentages. Numbers w/o
parenthesis are the primary reason for the
conversion.
Percentages do not add to 100% due to rounding.
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alternative and inconsistent right to terminate under the
Default clause. This assumes that the contractor has not
abandoned performance and a reasonable time period has
passed since the delivery date. [Ref. B:p. 685] This elec-
tion to permit continued performance can be done through
inaction as well as by the intentional or unintentional
actions taken by the Government. The proof for this defense
by the contractor also reguires that the contractor place a
reliance upon the Government's encouragement to continue
performance to his detriment. This reliance is often
evidenced by continuing to incur costs in connection with
continued performance under the provisions of the contract
[Ref. B:pp. 690-694].
In three of the seven cases, in which the Government
encouraged continued performance, active steps taken by
contracting officers and their representatives were relied
upon by the Board in rendering their decision. In Case 1,
the PCO exercised a contract option while the ACO was in the
process of terminating for default. In Case 2, the Govern-
ment's QA representative performed an acceptance inspection
after the scheduled delivery date. In Case 10, the
contracting officer advised a defaulting contractor to place
his "one or two day" delivery proposal in writing. This
response was interpreted by the Board as encouragement of
continued performance.
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Inaction by the Government was cited by the Board as
the justification for converting the remaining four cases to
terminations for convenience. In Cases 3, 4, and 11, the
Government attempted to terminate for default at a point
beyond the reasonable time period in which it should have
taken such action. The circumstances of Case 8 involved the
"eyes and ears of the contracting officer," a Government QA
representative. The contracting officer had been aware, or
should have been aware through his representative, that the
first article units and the production units were not
manufactured at the same facility as required by the
contract. Failure to take immediate action upon learning of
this fact waived the Government's right to subsequently use
it as a basis for a default termination.
Thus, in nearly half of the cases (46.7%), the
Government attempted to exercise its right to terminate for
default when it had previously waived its rights to do so.
2 . Mistake
A unilateral mistake by the contractor may be
grounds for relief if the Government knew, or should have
known, of the error. The requirements for relief are (1) a
determination whether the alleged mistake is the type for
which relief is granted, and (2) that the Government should
have known of the error. The reason for which relief of a
unilateral mistake is granted fall into two categories,
misreading specifications and clerical or arithmetical
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errors. In determining whether the Government knew, or
should have known of the mistake in a contractor's bid,
rests upon the adequacy of the verification request. If a
contracting officer knows or suspects a mistake, he must
notify the offeror to call attention to the suspected error.
According to FAR para. 14.607(c)(1), the contracting officer
must "point out the suspected mistake or otherwise identify
the area of proposal where the suspected mistake is" and
request verification. [Ref. B:pp. 223-236]
The circumstances of Case 5 are straight from the
textbook, i.e., the mistake was proven from the contractor's
recent performance of a contract thought to be of the same
nature. The Government's bid verification request failed to
call attention to the specific area in which the suspected
error was located, but took the form of "Double check your
bid and tell if it is correct" request. This case was the
only one of this nature and does not merit additional
analysis.
3 . Contract Lacked First Article Approval Clause
Failure to deliver acceptable preproduction items,
e.g., first articles and prototypes, is not a failure to
deliver supplies [Ref. B:p. 655]. To overcome this limita-
tion, the FAR provides the First Article Approval clause
(para. 52.2 09-3 & -4) to use with such contracts.
No such clause was used in Case 11, but the Govern-
ment still attempted to use it as a secondary justification
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for its T for D action. The primary reason for terminating
was discussed in Section 1 above, Government Encouraged
Continued Performance. In consideration of the nature of
the case and its single occurrence, further analysis would
not serve in the research effort of identifying frequent
problems in the acquisition process.
4 . Government Hindrance
A contractor's performance can be affected by the
Government's action or inaction, causing performance to be
more costly or difficult. If the Government's action is
wrongful, it will have breached its implied duty to
cooperate and not to hinder or interfere with the contrac-
tor's performance [Ref. B:p. 212]. To recover, the contrac-
tor must prove a causal relationship to the problems
encountered [Ref. B:p. 213]. The providing of defective
Government-furnished equipment can be viewed as a hindrance
as can a defective specification [Ref. B:p. 655].
In Case 6, the Government's erroneous requirement
for an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certification
prior to acceptance and payment in the performance of
another contract directly caused the contractor's financial
difficulties that led to his nonperformance on two other
contracts. During the preaward survey the proceeds from the
first contract were clearly linked to the successful comple-
tion of the terminated contracts, thus the causal relation-
ship was satisfied. In Case 9, the required use of the
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Government-furnished equipment, which subsequently proved to
be defective, caused the nonperformance beyond the delivery
date of several related contracts. Another example of
Government hindrance was presented in Case 12 . The
contractor based his bid upon a solicitation which contained
none of the drawings necessary for manufacturing the circuit
boards. During the post-award period, the Government could
not locate the drawings, but insisted upon performance.
Normally, the contractor should have requested the missing
drawings and by bidding on a contract with no drawings, the
contractor assumed all the cost risks of performance.
However, since the issuance of solicitations without
drawings was the standard procedure, the Government's
refusal to provide them to the contractor upon award was a
violation of the Government's implied duty to cooperate.
This area was considered significant for represented 2
percent of the total cases analyzed.
5. Substantial Compliance
As stated in Section 1, a failure to deliver
acceptable first articles is not a failure to deliver
supplies. The proof rests upon an evaluation of the
significance of the defects present in the first article
units provided by the contractor. Minor defects do not
justify rejection of the first articles, but should result
in a qualified acceptance. [Ref. B:pp. 655-656] In Cases
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13 and 14, by the Government's admission during the Board's




The research yielded only one pertinent case in
which the Government terminated for default on this basis.
The case is not considered a recurrent problem. As
discussed in Chapter IV, Case 15, The Government must prove
that the contractor refuses to perform, expresses an intent-
tion not to perform, or states an inability to perform or
the facts clearly show that inability [Ref. 15:p. 528]. The
difficulty lies in establishing the contractor's "definite
and uneguivocal manifestation" not to perform in accordance
with the term of the contract [Ref. 15:p. 528].
7 Excusable Delay
The purpose for an excusable delay clause is to
protect the contractor from penalties of late performance
and to permit additional compensation if the Government
constructively accelerates performance [Ref. 2:p. 389]. FAR
para. 52.249-8 provides that, except for defaults of subcon-
tractors, the contractor shall not be terminated for default
nor held liable for excess costs if failure to perform the
contract was from causes beyond his control and without his
fault or negligence [Ref. 2:p. 389]. To gualify for an
excusable delay, the excuse must have:




been unforeseen and he could not have been expected to
foresee, and
3. caused the delay [Ref. 2:pp. 391-396].
The excusable delay in Case 7 was one of "unusually"
severe weather. The weather must have been unusually severe
for the time of year and the location of performance, which
was unforeseen and beyond the contractor's control, and not
caused by his negligence. In Case 7, the error was made by
the Government when it fixed the location of performance as
just the lumber mill vice including the logging roads over
which the logs were to be transported. The Board cited
excusable delay as a secondary reason for sustaining the
contractor's appeals in Cases 8 and 9. In Case 8, the
Government was permitted, by the contract, to review the
manuals for up to 60 days prior to returning them to the
contractor. This review lasted seven months. In Case 9,
the contractor qualified for an excusable delay as a result
of his reliance upon the Government-furnished test equip-
ment, which later was determined to be defective. With the
inclusion of secondary reasons for the Board's decision,
this area represents 2 percent of the sample case
conversions.
D. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
The cases were analyzed in an attempt to identify
characteristics that appeared frequently throughout the
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the Government experiences frequent difficulties when
terminating for default. Those common characteristics are
enumerated in Table 3 and presented below:
1. Low Unit Price—The highest unit cost was for $14,280,
followed by $3,748. All others were less than $2,000
per unit.
2. Low Contract Price—Eleven of the fifteen cases
analyzed were less than $1 million.
3
.
Duration of the Dispute—The average time elapsed
between the termination for default action and the
Board's decision was 40.4 months for contracts exceed-
ing $100,000, but just 10.8 months for those under
$100,000.
4. Non-complex materials—With the possible exception of
the blade spacers for wind tunnel compressors in Case
11, all of the supplies listed in Table 3 were not of
a sophisticated nature.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PREFACE
Although fifteen cases over the course of four years
certainly does not lead the researcher to believe that the
Government's procedures in executing terminations for
default is seriously flawed, the research accomplished in
this study identified several deficiencies in this process.
These deficiencies are presented in the conclusions cited in
this chapter. The recommendations portion will address the
identified shortfalls, followed by a discussion of the
research questions and suggestions for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Conclusion 1
The problems identified are not a result of new
policies, regulations, and interpretations of previous Board
decisions, but are basic principles of contract administra-
tion, such as, estoppel, Government hindrance, substantial
compliance, and excusable delay.
The deficiencies noted were in the basic principles
of which every warranted contracting officer should have a
thorough working knowledge. Seven of the fifteen total
cases analyzed were overturned by the Board because the
Government had previously waived its rights to exercise a
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default termination. Four of the seven decisions resulted
from Government inaction.
The principle of Government Hindrance was cited in
twenty percent of the cases. Two of the three cases were
determined by erroneous Government actions in administering
other contracts.
Thirteen percent of the cases involved the principle
of substantial compliance applied to contracts involving
first article units. In consideration of the current
Government commitment to increasing competition through
break-out procedures, dual sourcing, and other methods, the
difficulties associated with administering a growing number
of first article contracts can only be expected to multiply.
2 . Conclusion 2
Many case decisions precipitated from a general lack
of communications.
This problem was directly responsible for four (26.7
percent) of the contracting officer's T for D actions being
converted to convenience terminations.
In Case 1, the ACO should have advised the PCO that
he was proceeding with a T for D action. In Cases 2 and 8,
the Government QA representative's actions were not relayed
to the contracting officer who was held responsible for this
knowledge.
The contracting officer's erroneous advice to the
contractor producing a first article unit, prior to
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consulting with the Government's program engineer, was




The contracts are characterized by low unit cost,
low contract value, and deliverables of a non-complex
nature.
An analysis of Table 3 reveals that all the unit
costs were under $15,000 and eight-six percent were under
$2,000. Seventy-three percent of the contracts had a value
of less than $1 million.
With the possible exception of the blade spacer
contract, the supplies can be characterized as low-tech,
routine purchases.
4 Conclusion 4
The higher dollar value contracts are involved in
the disputes process for a much longer period of time than
are the low dollar value contracts.
As stated in the Chapter V, Section D analysis, the
contracts valued in excess of $100,000 are in the disputes
process for an average of 3 1/2 years, while the average
time in disputes for contracts valued at less than $100,000
is eleven months. This could be a result of contractors
with lower value contracts choosing the expedited or
accelerated procedures of the ASBCA, which are designed for




Increase the degree of communications between the
members of the acquisition team.
Measures need to be implemented to preclude the
situation, exhibited in Case 1, in which the ACO had
commenced a default termination while the PCO simultaneously-
exercised a contract option to increase the number of
deliveries. The general lack of communications between the
ACO and the Government's QA representative led to sustained
contractors' appeals in Cases 2 and 8. Adding Case 13 to
this category brings the total to nearly 27 percent of the
total sample cases analyzed. A coordinated team effort
would present a true "single face to industry." The
solution to this problem could be as simple as stressing the
need for active communications and the citing of documented





Increase the degree of expertise and contract
awareness of acquisition personnel at all levels.
It is evident from the research that contracting
officers and their representatives are not consistently
applying basic contract knowledge in the decision-making
process. The application of this knowledge in the Waiver of
Government's Rights and in the Substantial Compliance
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aspects of first article testing procedures would have
reduced the number of cases in this study by over half.
Possible causes of these errors would include: Lack of
training and education, understaf f ing, inadequate super-
vision, poor legal or other advice, and/or insufficient





Contracting officers must be made aware of the
requirement to be decisive, particularly in areas that would
impact the grounds for a default termination, through the
training, career development, and evaluation processes.
The need for prompt action is supported by the four
cases, in Chapter V.C.I, in which inaction by the
contracting officer waived the Government's right to subse-
quently terminate for default based upon the contractor's
delivery delinquencies.
4 Recommendation 4
Implement a contract management information system
that would increase the visibility of contract delivery
dates and current status.
This system would not necessarily be designed to
favorably impact the contractors' compliance with schedule
delivery dates, but it would increase the awareness of the
Government acquisition personnel of contracts that are in or
approaching default. This awareness could reduce the
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occurrences of unintentional encouragement of continued
performance.
5. Recommendation 5
Conduct an evaluation of the quality of legal advice
that the contracting officers are receiving when deciding to
terminate a contract for default.
The decision to pursue a termination for default
action is the responsibility and decision of the contracting
officer. However, in making that decision, he relies upon
the information he has gathered and the advice he has
received. Once he has gathered all the available informa-
tion, a primary person from whom he solicits advice is the
lawyer. The legal issues in the majority of the cases
analyzed were clear and not subject to a court's new inter-
pretation of contracting principles of law. In the opinion
of the researcher, the cases never should have gone to the
Board for a resolution. With improved legal advice, the
occurrence of T for D conversions by the Board or Court
could be dramatically reduced.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Can meaningful conclusions be drawn from an analysis
of sustained ASBCA and U.S. Claims Court appeals concerning
Department of Defense contracts which were originally
terminated for default (T for D) , but subsequently settled
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as terminations for convenience (T for C) as a result of an
agency board or judicial decision?
It is feasible to draw meaningful conclusions that
will improve the acquisition process using the methodology
of this research.
The analysis uncovered several areas in which better
Government performance in contact administration could
reduce the number of erroneous actions identified through
this research, such as, an increase in basic contracting
knowledge, communications, and decisiveness. A complete
explanation is contained in the Recommendations section of
this chapter.
2 . Subsidiary Question 1
What are the principles generally cited for sustain-
ing a contractor's appeal of a default determination?
The most frequently cited ASBCA decisions for
sustaining a contractor's appeal are, in descending order,
Government Encouragement of Continued Performance,
Government Hindrance, and Substantial Compliance.
As shown in Table 2, the frequencies of occurrences
are 46.7 percent, 20.0 percent and 13.3 percent, respec-
tively. Of the seven cases in which the contractor's
performance was encouraged beyond the schedule delivery
date, four were a result of inaction by the Government while
two of the other three involved actions by the contracting
officer's representative. A particularly interesting aspect
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of two of the three cases involving hindrance was that these
successful appeals resulted from the Government's wrongful
actions in administering other contracts. The two cases
citing substantial compliance as justification for
sustaining the contractor's appeal exhibited a general
misunderstanding of the principle of law when applied to
contracts involving first article units. A more in-depth
discussion of the individual cases is presented in Chapter
V.C.
3 . Subsidiary Question 2
Once a contract termination is successfully
appealed, what are the contracting officer's options and
associated considerations?
In some instances, the Board or Court will direct
specific actions and dollar remedies in their decision. In
these cases, the contracting officer has no options since
his actions have been directed, specifically. However, with
most agency or court decisions, the contracting officer does
have possible options through which to resolve the contrac-
tual relationship.
1. The Government has the right to appeal a Board or
Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. [Ref. 2:p. 955]
2. If the contract performance has not commenced, a
recission of the contract could be issued to excuse
the contractor [Ref. 2:pp. 238-241]. A recission is
normally associated with contractors' claims of




Reinstatement . The parties are always free to
reinstate the contract, regardless of the stage to
which the dispute has progressed. Although this
option is infrequently exercised, it can be of mutual
benefit to the Government and the contractor [Ref.
2:p. 709]. It may be especially applicable to
contracts erroneously terminated when the first
article unit did substantially comply with the
contract's requirements.
4. Reformation . If the parties can agree, the contract
can be reinstated and modified to require only
partial, or other-wise modified, performance [Ref.
2:pp. 238-240].
5 Proceed with the Termination for the Convenience of
the Government in which the Government admits the
mistake and assumes the obligations of payment of
allowable and allocable costs and profit on costs
incurred.
Reformation and reinstatement require a negotiated
agreement as to the necessary contract modifications, but
still require the contractor to deliver the supplies. The
only option listed above, other than proceeding with the T
for C, that was evidenced from the cases, was a reformation
in Case 5. The contractor's bid was based upon only one
part of a two part assembly. The contract was reformed to
permit the contractor to build, and receive payment for,
only the one part.
Normally, the contracting officer has few available
options, therefore his considerations require no evaluation.
A contractor who has failed to deliver the contracted
supplies will be hesitant to commit himself to such an
arrangement and will often choose the T for C, in which case
he is "made whole." However, in those rare instances in
which the contractor and the Government desire to complete
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the contract, the contracting officer must first evaluate
the situation by answering the same questions he asked when
making the original decision to T for D.
Regardless of the course of action chosen, the
decision must be made in accordance with the provisions of
the Board or Court's decision, coordinated with higher
authority, and serve in the best interests of the
Government
.
4 . Subsidiary Question 3
How might the T for D decision process be improved
to reduce the number of successful contractor appeals?
An in-depth discussion into the requirements for
making improvements to the decision process are presented in
the Recommendations Section of this chapter, such as,
improved communications, increased knowledge and awareness,
decisive action, a contract administration management infor-
mation system, and better legal advice.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This analysis illuminated several deficiencies in the
Government acquisition process. However, since the research
was limited in scope and methodology, many other areas that
also promise fruitful results are presented below:
1. Research the degree to which T for C's are exercised
vice a T for D as a result of the Government sharing a
high degree of responsibility for the contractor's
performance difficulties.
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2. Research the feasibility of increased automation in
the contract administration function, as presented in
Recommendation 4.
3. Evaluate the practical application of default models
to the acquisition process with a focus on the identi-
fication of early warning signals.
4. Evaluate the existing professional relationship




REPORT OF TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMED
SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS FOR THE FISCAL
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Report of Transactions and Proceedings of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals for the
Fiscal Year Ending 30 September 1985
This report is furnished pursuant to paragraph 9 of
Charter for the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 1
July 1979. The statistics hereinafter set forth reflect the
hearing, consideration and determination of appeals
originating in the Army, Navy, Air Force and DLA and other
Defense agencies. They also include appeals docketed by
ASBCA for and at the request of the Department of State, the
Agency for International Development, the Department of
Health & Human Services, and the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, all on a full-time basis; and some other agencies on
an ad hoc arrangement.
2 . The following statistics cover activities of the
Board during the report period, and the current reserve of
pending matters:
A. Appeals docketed during FY 1985
(Including 32 reinstatements) 1638
B. Appeals disposed of during FY 1985 1293
C. Number of Cases Pending July 1,
Number of Cases Pending July 1,
Number of Cases Pending July 1,
Number of Cases Pending July 1,







Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1966 875
Number of Cases Pending July 1, 1967 873
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1968 911
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1969 899
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1970 1123
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1971 1265
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1972 1254
Number of Cases Pending July 1, 1973 1197
Number of Cases Pending July 1, 1974 1127
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1975 1065
Number of Cases Pending July 1. 1976 1031
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1977 1134
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1978 1163
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1979 1221
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1980 1259
Number of Cases Pending October If 1981 1301
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1982 1594
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1983 1695
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1984 1729
Number of Cases Pending October 1. 1985 2074
Net Increase in Docket, FY 1985 345
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To Be Set 441
Hearing Set 152
Transcript & Briefs Due 152
Suspense 131
Ready to Write 147
TOTAL 2 047
Rule 12 122
G. Summary since May 1, 1949 (date of creation of






The conclusion of Fiscal Year 1985 reflects that once
again the ASBCA has received a record number of new appeals.
For the first time in the history of the Board the number of
pending appeals exceeds two thousand. The magnitude of the
workload leads to two inescapable conclusions. First,
additional personnel must be authorized. Second, the Board
must develop internal procedures which permit the parties
under appropriate appeals to opt for "Prompt Procedures."
In June of 1985, a comprehensive "ASBCA Management
Improvement Plan" was prepared by an ASBCA committee as
justification for additional resources and submitted by the
then Acting Chairman to the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense. The plan discussed the current
staffing of the Board, provided justification for additional
personnel positions and associated space and equipment,
analyzed the status of the Board's docket, detailed internal
controls to better manage the docket, and calculated future
work load projections based on historical data. The plan
further detailed steps already taken or in the process of
being taken to change methods of processing appeals to
improve productivity. Emphasis was placed on disposing of
the oldest ready-to-write appeals on our docket. This goal
has now largely been accomplished. However, this has
resulted in a large build-up of pending appeals which must
be heard. The plan uniformly received positive comments and
indicated efforts to implement the Columbia Technology
management study recommendations made in December 1983.
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However, the plan was held in abeyance pending the
completion of the process for selecting a new ASBCA
Chairman.
On 1 October 1985, the undersigned was appointed as the
new Chairman. As chairman, I have, amongst other actions,
initiated the following changes:
revised the docket assignment system to more evenly
balance the work load and have begun intense docket
reviews and docket adjustments;
redefined the Commissioners work assignments to
help relieve the Judges from numerous administra-
tive docket functions;
revised the Rule 12 docket processing system to
balance the work load and to continue to insure
substantial compliance with time deadlines;
reassigned computer terminals to improve efficien-
cy; (in the immediate future a new, expanded
computer system will be installed which will permit
each Judge access to a terminal including capabili-
ty for automated legal research) ; and
initiated procedures on a trial basis, subject to
the approval of both parties, for prompt processing
of appropriate cases.
Many of the above mentioned "changes" are cosmetic,
temporary stop-gap measures, preliminary or experimental
steps designed to immediately improve working conditions and
productivity. However, insufficient number of personnel and
inadequate office space are limiting constraints which
severely restrict any significant improvement in productivi-
ty. I have every reason to believe that needed resources
will be approved as soon as a management plan is formally
submitted to DOD for approval. The filling of existing
vacant billets, which includes three Administrative Judge
positions, and the submission of a revised management plan
are the Board's top priorities. Nominations for at least
two of the vacant judge positions and the management plan
will be submitted by 1 December 1985.
On 23 September 1985, the General Accounting Office
issued its final report [GAO/NSIAD-85-102 ] on its review of
the ASBCA. GAO concluded:
Although the Board is not organizationally independent
of the Department of Defense, no centralized control
over the Board's activities is exercised within the
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Department. Further, the Board is perceived by members
of the contracting community to be independent in its
decision-making process.
However, members of contract appeal boards are not as
insulated as they could be from agency control . Members
are appointed and the Office of Personnel Management
maintains can be removed by the agencies which bring
disputes before the boards. Other employees who perform
quasi-judicial functions like board members are selected
from a government-wide register and can be removed only
by the Merit Systems Protection Board. Legislation
should be considered if the Congress wants to insulate
board members from agency control to the same degree as
other quasi-judicial employees.
The Board has issued Interim Procedures for processing
applications of attorney fees filed pursuant to the Equal
Access To Justice Act (Section 504 of Title 5 of the United
States Code) . The EAJA imposes strict jurisdictional
deadlines for the filing of applications and for the data
required to be filed with the application. The EAJA
includes numerous procedural and substantive issues which
are not clearly resolved and may initially cause an undue
burden on the Board's limited resources.
While the statistical data on its face doesn't appear to
bode well for the Board, there are a number of positive
signs that are very encouraging to me. Since the effective
date of the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, the number of
docketed appeals has nearly doubled. There were 12 21
pending appeals as of October 1979. During this same time,
the number of ASBCA judges, which was recognized in 1978 as
being too low, as well as the size of the Board's staff has
not substantially changed. The merely administrative
functions associated with the increased workload have had a
tremendous impact on the Board's resources. We have
literally been buried with paper and are bursting at the
seams. Despite the necessity for the Judges to absorb a
significant amount of these additional administrative
functions, the judges' productivity has remained relatively
stable. I am convinced that when we acquire adequate
additional personnel, the situation will improve. The fact
that productivity has remained as high as it has reflects
that the Board is blessed with quality people, who are





Data re Appeals Disposed of by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
During FY's 1981-1985
Origin of FY FY FY FY FY
Appeals: 1981 1982 1983 1984* 1985**
Air Force 199 188 255 234 258
Army 322 341 425 524 463
DLA 154 139 157 218 232
Navy 206 198 212 267 251
Other







Contractor $335,983 $420,115 $173,058 $241,096 $294,304
Gov't $114,920 $380,718 $286,606 $238,968 $102,762





544 644 781 966 994
Small Bus.
Set Aside 128 180 177 302 371
Real Party
in Interest
Prime Cont. 832 814 1,013 1, 120 1,165
Sub-Contr
.
82 103 91 110 49
Both 1 12 5 23 18
Other 9 22 53 33
Method of Award
Adver 453 551 720 781 735
Negotiated 419 353 329 396 366
Other 43 34 31
Unknown 51 129 164
**
29 cases were cancelled as docketed in error or
duplicates.
28 cases were cancelled as docketed in error or
duplicates.
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FY FY FY FY FY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Contract Type:
Basic Agreem. 2 5 3 20 5
CPFF 29 19 42 24 21
CPIF 10 6 2 8 6
FFP 737 738 918 1,059 1,031
FPIF 24 13 7 5 11
Requirements 36 57 37 32 50
Other 77 100 122 158 141
Kind of Proc.
Construe. 338 358 427 515 504
R&D 22 34 13 18 16
Service 135 212 236 246 247
Supply 380 299 401 437 427
Surplus Sale 21 20 24 16 5







claim) 1 4 - 8 6
Allow. Costs 29 53 55 33 65
Basic Agreem. 1 - 1
Bid Mistake 12 11 11 15 20
Bid Protest 9 8 3 -
Breach 8 6 6 35
Changes 266 236 285 243 244
Cost Acctg.
Standards 6 4 2 -
Cost or Pric.
Data 9 14 17 19 21
Cost Princ. 20 15 3 9 25
Default 235 210 250 253 245
Delivery 1 - 2 8 7
Differing Site
Conditions 33 27 25 38 68
Discounts - 1 - 1 11
All Disputes - - - - 8


















































FY FY FY FY FY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
18 1 _
6 3 9 13
21 28 21 16 35
2 1 1 7 36
1 - 4 10 19
3 1 - 1 -
8 5 8 6 16
1 - - - 2
12 12 18 17 -
7 14 12 5 5
11 19 20 19 53
2 - - - 3
3 - - 1
5 9 5 6 25
8 5 7 5 4
6 7 2 14 15
9 8 1
18 17 15 29 62
1 - - - 1
1 1 4 7
2 2 2 8
25 22 36 24 36
6 2 1 4 4
6 6 13 29
7 1 1 1 3
4 6 3 4 31
1
81
5 6 4 9
97 152 160 100
1
513 2 4 10
2 3 7 6 7
>r
14 17 18 21 31
5 6 6 4 16
12 13 10 49 36
37 15 10 32 2
34 82 83
*The statistics on this page are not longer truly
representative of the subject matter of the Board's cases,
especially under the Contracts Disputes Act. Changes in
categories will be made as practical.
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FY FY FY FY FY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
9. Hearings and Days
of Hearing:*
Hearings:
In Wash. D.C. 38 36 56 46 58
Outside Wash.
D.C 147 136 151 169 181
Percentage
outside Wash.
D.C. 79% 79% 73% 79% 76%
Days of Hearing:
In Wash. D.C. 61 94 142 100 175
Outside Wash.
D.C. 304 286 278 349 393
Percentage
outside Wash.





sought) : 58 77 148 137 300
11. Pre-Hearing
Confer. 120 56 49 114 228
12. Rule 12 Proc.
:
# Proceed. 183 187 205 229 262
13. Record only
Disposit. 58 79 73 75 168
14. Disposition:




17 14 23 28 15
Dism/Rule 3 28 78 123 124 118
Dism/Rule 31 90 88 107 184 41
Lack of
Jurisd. 3 4 35 31 45
Dism/Withd. 121
Reg. CO/ Dec.




FY FY FY FY FY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Denied 169 168 192 205 226
Sustained 130 127 162 158 146





termined) * 53 42 46 59 59
15. Time on Dock.
(days from date
of docket, to













Average 171 173 156 151 149








Average 3 3 34 49 50 72




























*Total dollars determined during FY 81 was $ 4,820,958,
*Total dollars determined during FY 82 was $35,142,367,
*Total dollars determined during FY 83 was $ 6,258,134,
*Total dollars determined during FY 84 was $19,104,775,






























For claims of $50,000 or under
the CO shall issue a decision
within 60 days. For certified
claims ouer $$50,000 the CO
shall issue a decision within
60 days or notify contractor
of the "reasonable" time
















U S SUPREME COURT
(certiotoril
Different procedures apply
for Tennessee Uolley Authority
and maritime contracts
Source: Cibinic, J. Jr
Administration
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AND SERVICE) (APRIL 1984)
(a)(1) The Government may, subject to paragraphs (c)and
(d) below, by written notice of default to the Contractor,
terminate this contract in whole or in part if the Contrac-
tor fails to:
(i) Deliver the supplies or to perform the services
within the time specified in this contract or any extension;
(ii) Make progress, so as to endanger performance of
this contract (but see subparagraph (a) (2) below) ; or
(iii) Perform any of the other provisions of this
contract (but see subparagraph (a) (2) below)
.
(2) The Government's right to terminate this contract
under subdivision (l)(ii) and (1) (iii) above, may be
exercised if the Contractor does not cure such failure
within 10 days (or more if authorized in writing by the
Contracting Officer) after receipt of the notice from the
Contracting Officer specifying the failure.
(b) If the Government terminates this contract in whole
or in part, it may acquire, under the terms and in the
manner the Contracting Officer considers appropriate,
supplies or services similar to those terminated, and the
Contractor will be liable to the Government for any excess
costs for those supplies or services. However, the
Contractor shall continue the work not terminated.
(c) Except for defaults of subcontractors at any tier,
the Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs if
the failure to perform the contract arises from causes
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of
the Contractor. Examples of such causes include (1) acts of
God or of the public enemy, (2) acts of the Government in
either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (3) fires, (4)
floods, (5) epidemics, (6) quarantine restrictions, (7)
strikes, (8) freight embargoes, and (9) unusually severe
weather. In each instance the failure to perform must be
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of
the Contractor.
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(d) If the failure to perform is caused by the default of
a subcontractor at any tier, and if the cause of the default
is beyond the control of both the Contractor and
subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of
either, the Contractor shall not be liable for any excess
costs for failure to perform, unless the subcontracted
supplies or services were obtainable from other sources in
sufficient time for the Contractor to meet the required
delivery schedule.
(e) If this contract is terminated for default, the
Government may require the Contractor to transfer title and
deliver to the Government, as directed by the Contracting
Officer, any (1) completed supplies, and (2) partially
completed supplies and materials, parts, tools, dies, jigs,
fixtures, plans, drawings, information, and contract rights
(collectively referred to as "manufacturing materials" in
this clause) that the Contractor has specifically produced
or acquired for the terminated portion of this contract.
Upon direction of the Contracting Officer, the Contractor
shall also protect and preserve property in its possession
in which the Government has an interest.
(f) The Government shall pay contract price for completed
supplies delivered and accepted. The Contractor and
Contracting Officer shall agree on the amount of payment for
manufacturing materials delivered and accepted and for the
protection and preservation of the property. Failure to
agree will be a dispute under the Disputes clause. The
Government may withhold from these amounts any sum the
Contracting Officer determines to be necessary to protect
the Government against loss because of outstanding liens or
claims of former lien holders.
(g) If, after termination, it is determined that the
Contractor was not in default, or that the default was
excusable, the rights and obligations of the parties shall
be the same as if the termination had been issued for the
convenience of the Government.
(h) The rights and remedies of the Government in this
clause are in addition to any other rights and remedies
provided by law or under this contract.
(End of clause)
(R 1-8.707)
(R 7-103.11 1959 AUG)
Alternate I (APR 1984). If the contract is for transpor-
tation or transportation-related services, delete paragraph
(f) of the basic clause, redesignate the remaining para-
graphs accordingly, and substitute the following paragraphs
(a) and (e) for paragraphs (a) and (e) of the basic clause:
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(a)(1) The Government may, subject to paragraphs (c) and
(d) below, by written notice of default to the Contrac-tor,
terminate this contract in whole or in part if the Con-
tractor fails to:
(i) Pick up the commodities or to perform the services,
including delivery services, within the time specified in
this contract or any extension;
(ii) Make progress, so as to endanger performance of
this contract (but see subparagraph (a) (2) below); or
(iii) Perform any of the other provisions of this
contract (but see subparagraph (a)(2) below).
(2) The Government's right to terminate this contract
under subdivisions (1) (ii) and (1) (iii) above, may be
exercised if the Contractor does not cure such failure
within 10 days (or more if authorized in writing by the
Contracting Officer) after receipt of the notice from the
Contracting Officer specifying the failure.
(e) If this contract is terminated while the Contractor
has possession of Government goods, the Contractor shall,
upon direction of the Contracting Officer, protect and
preserve the goods until surrendered to the Government or
its agent. The Contractor and Contracting Officer shall
agree on payment for the preservation and protection of
goods. Failure to agree on an amount will be a dispute
under the Disputes clause.
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